Let’s look at photography (my hobby), arguably the most important purchasing-driver of computers (after the ability to access the internet) by consumers. Media management (yes, on the desktop) remains more than a Billion dollar market opportunity.

Case in point: new announcements of Adobe Lightroom and Apple Aperture tout enhanced interoperability with third party plugins to manage and edit your photographs. Don’t you feel good about that warm open-source-like karma of interoperability?

I don’t. Both vendors have deployed their next trick to customer imprisonment. And plenty of uninformed customers will fall for it. Here is why you shouldn’t:

1/ There is no need for an additional platform for photo management.
Photo editing capabilites of both applications are mediocre (no layer based editing, no advanced local editing etc.) and their asset management capabilities are little more than a replica of file system capabilities (even photographic attributes such as exposure, aperture and other attributes are maintained by the file-system metadata today). So, except for making nice photo albums and calendars, why else would you slug thousands of photographs in a proprietary asset management format that is less reliable than the underlying file-system and requires seperate backup and archiving strategies to maintain.

2/ Plugins have worked for years on file-system based photographs.
The announcement of the interoperability with plugins is really old news as those third party applications have been working with file-system based photographs for years. This is a platform on top of a platform, designed to milk more money out of customers and locks them into a proprietary technology stack. A prison with the windows open is still a prison.

3/ The operating system needs-to and will evolve faster.
The pace of meaningful innovation of the Personal Computer OS is deplorable. Microsoft has not made the PC operating system significantly smarter over the last ten years and that has opened the window of opportunity for Apple to surpass Microsoft in usability (rather than functionality). The ability to easily create and manage user-generated content such as, Photography and Video, has now become important adoption drivers to the platform, OS-vendors have yet to respond to. Photographic capabilities should be built-in (not priced-on). These days the unique media experience of the platform is the differentiation that sells the computer (since they all do internet quite well).

As a consumer, buying into seperate photography management siloes will cost you significant time and money (as the former CEO of a photo software company, researching the alternatives, I tried). My advice is to wait until an agile vendor steps up and turns media management into a core competency of the computing experience.

In the words of Ray Lane (partner at KPCB and former COO of Oracle) who once said customers are better off skipping some steps of innovation (in his case to skip client-server for three-tier internet architecture), I have just presented you with my reasoning to skip-over Adobe Lightroom and Apple Aperture. Not because I don’t like some of its functionality, but because it is strategically a dead-end street.

The next evolution of media management will soon eradicate the old one and deliver lasting differentiation to the vendor that owns it and provides a much, much better media experience to the consumer.

I am planning on having something to do with that.

Tags: Platform, Photography, Consumer, OS X, Operating System, Innovation, Integrity, Adobe, Microsoft, Apple

I bought the Apple TV the moment it came out about 9 months or so ago. Initially surprised by the tethering requirement to a computer running iTunes, I used it quite a bit as a giant picture frame (showing off on a 50" plasma), playing music during parties and watching kids shows with my daughter. Now, with Take 2, Apple has stepped it up and provides HD quality movies (and 5.1 Dolby Digital audio) and, less talked about, removed the need for a separate Airport Express to stream any iTunes audio through your Entertainment center.

But very interesting to see is how a technology called Bonjour (formerly Rendezvous - 13 year old Apple technology, first available in AppleTalk) automatically finds and connects iTunes capable devices on the network and staving off the need for central media management. And it does so quite well and transparently. Movies, music purchased on the Apple TV show up on the iTunes on your laptop and vice versa. When Comcast showed off a central media server for the home at CES 2007 that could stream content to any of your cable connected devices, I thought it was going to give Apple a run for its money on the movie rental business. But more than one year past and still product from Comcast in sight. Don't even start about the current Comcast DVR mess, possibly the worst UI experience I've ever encountered (the Tivo deal may ease the pain a little, but the early news is not encouraging). With Apple TV, no more runs to Blockbuster, or mailing DVDs to and from Netflix, just sit at home and watch whatever you want.

What I admire most about Apple is its ability to not just create new products but that it adjust its business and operating model so those products can succeed. That is a gift bigger companies like Oracle (my former employer) and Microsoft can learn from. Media and content are the new Consumer Packaged Goods of this century and if technology vendors don't invest in the ecosystem around it their technology solutions will continue to yield mediocre user experiences and sub-par adoption.

In converging media markets, the new leaders are going to be the ones that build disruptive business models first and great technology products to support that, second.

Can't wait for Apple to strike a deal with Comcast and similar to the iPhone strategy, replace the Comcast DVR with an Apple TV capable of receiving regular broadcasts as well as tap into the power of iTunes. All Apple needs to do is use its cash war-chest to "threaten" ComCast to go at it alone, just like it "convinced" AT&T it would be better for AT&T not to let Apple become a Mobile Virtual Network Operator.

Tags: Getty-Images, Investment Banks, Revenues, Wall-Street, Debt, Organic growth

We could debunk every statement Getty-Images made with regards to its recent earnings call but we've essentially done so in our extensive blogs about the company. Apart from the negative outcome of the call, we instead want to highlight the systemic attitudinal problem of the company.

First off, Getty's success is based on the fact that it believes it can predict how images (or other media assets) are going to be used by the buyer. It continuously re-purposes images and image rights to meet a supposed buying trends it is never going to be able to predict. With massive changes in photography Getty has frequently trailed trends rather than enabled them. The usage of the image should be determined between seller and buyer, with Getty's infrastructure merely supporting that transaction.

Second, the usage and type classification in the earnings call is the kind of double dipping I've seen many companies in trouble do. There is a dramatic overlap between editorial, creative, rights managed, royalty free, royalty ready and a myriad of other popular image definitions. The sole metric of success for the company is number of images sold at what ASP, and at what cost. No Wall-Street investor will be able to make sense of the fog Getty has put up in the conference call to hide the fact that organic growth is miserable.

Third, Getty arrogantly describes their (lackluster) performance as the market trend, as if they are the market. No, Getty, the market of image usage is actually growing faster than you are able to support. The real news is that Getty is losing market-share.

The lack of transparency makes Getty-Images an un-investable business, both from a market and acquisition perspective. The bottom line from the call simply confirms that, forget about everything in-between.

Tags: Apple, Broadcast, Comcast, Consumer Packaged Goods, DVR, Netflix, Media, Entertainment, ITunes, HD, Mobile

The Puffer Fish of the imaging market, as described in my previous blog have large volumes of fleeting image assets. Yes, dear Wall-street analyst, they may have been experiencing double-digit growth temporarily but we believe that originates from non-organic growth and growth attributable to the incorporation of that non-organic supply into the global brand, in Getty-Images' case for example. If you keep buying stock photography companies you delight existing buyers with an ever increasing supply, but the novelty of that supply wears off real fast. In the end that apparent growth comes at a high cost. So witnessed by the most recent disappointing earnings reports.



Jupiter-images is literally pursueing an image super-store strategy, a copy of Getty-Images' strategy. They too have been buying stock companies. Stock companies strike deals with photographers to create a good looking selection. Yet most images have a value that is completely photographer agnostic. The value is in the photograph, not the photographer. So, a super-store of images by definition contains a small amount of sellable images.

But the real interesting fact about the imaging industry (and many related to it) is that all images have fleeting value, especially after they have been sold for the first time. Photography is the ultimate Long Tail market, with a very, very long tail and a tiny body. A great reason why any player with a "premium" imaging strategy is relegated to selling to very small and concentrated set of buyers.

Not unlike the music industry where we are used to buying music collections on CDs, a large part of the stock photography market still sells collections of photographs to artificially increase the number of images sold and the average sales price (ASP) per image. As a result, investors may think the ASP is somewhat stable and predictable and the value of the super-store may not be as grim as it seems. But Super-stores will never contain enough image variations to meet Long Tail demand. As a result, commissioned photography is still going strong.

Most photographers that produce sellable images still sell their images offline and commissioned. The ones that do sell online, literally use a total of hundreds of photo-sites today to tap into a Long Tail demand. All these factors are hardly evidence that Getty Images is indeed meeting the needs of the photography market.

On a side note: MacNN reported this week that Adobe has halted its stock photo library, perhaps it is getting ready to buy Getty-Images? I think they are smarter than that.

Tags: Getty-Images, Super-Store, ASP, Agency, Images, Photographers, Media, Margin

I have recieved a lot of inquiries from Wall-street personalities and companies due to the gracious blog posting in PE Week Wire on the imaging marketplace, so I wanted to dive deeper to clarify beyond just the financials.

1/ Getty-Images does not clearly distinguish between total addressable market and "market", probably to puff itself up as the owner of the imaging marketplace. More than 50% of (traceable corporate) images produced (by about 17,000 commercial Photography companies in the US) are generated by suppliers making less than $5M in revenues and have less than 10 employees. Very few of those (less than 1%) use Getty-Images as their distribution channel. In fact the majority of images sold in the world are traded offline, yes, offline (Getty-Images started its online presence in 2000, after going public on NASDAQ in July of 1996 and re-listing on NYSE in 1998). In addition, the peer-to-peer exchange of digital images, we estimate, is at least twice the size of the traceable exchange. It is quite irrelevant if Getty-Images is performing better than its peers, but Getty-Images by no means owns more than 10% of the addressable market. The risk for Getty is that a new kid on the block will be more successful in emptying out the market with a new business model, rather than outperform the existing players.

2/ Getty-Images is not a marketplace, it is a Super-Store in the economic sense of those definitions. A large part of the images in their store are produced by their own photographers (organic and non-organic) and sold to their existing, primarily agency customers. But the real definition of a "free-market" marketplace is that customer own their product which they sell, un-arbitrated and completely transparent, to buyers. Getty-Images charges exorbitant commissions (known to be in the range of 60%), which can't hardly be considered a marketplace transaction fee. It is suggested on the internet that Getty-Images plays unfair, even include changing photographs and forcing the original photographers to hand Getty-Images an additional 100% of the delta. True or not, that is not the kind of trust that makes anyone believe that Getty-Images will become a true marketplace.

3/ The photo acronyms are meaningless. Stock photography does not exist. It is an artificial definition, used mostly to identify a low priced photograph. But a "stock" photograph can be sold rights-managed, royalty free or exclusive and in the new world of publishing even be published as editorial. And therefor, being the leader in stock photography means absolutely NOTHING. Did you know an exclusive photograph is really not exclusive (it is only exclusive to a certain usage), that a buyer has no guarantee that the photo does not show up somewhere else. So, the only measure of success is how many photographs the company has sold and how many times over.

4/ Getty-Images has very restrictive policies to let users participate in their Super-Store, another sign it does not meet a true marketplace definition. WIth dSLR sales growing last year at 60% rate and 9B images produced on those cameras (18B cumulative dSLR images since 2003), Getty-Images is clearly not successful in monetizing the exchange of those images (even if you argue the majority of images have no re-sale value). The number of professional photographers is estimated to be around 36,000 according to PPA and D&B numbers. We believe Getty-Images falls short on counting the majority of those as their suppliers. We believe the unincorporated semi-pros that produce at least one sellable image to be much, much larger (cumulative roughly around 9M dSLR have been sold since 2003).

So, regardless from which angle you slice the business, Getty-Images by no means, has amassed critical penetration in the Total Addressable Market of image exchange. But if you artificially constrict the size of the market by calling it stock, rights-managed, royalty free, editorial or creative, perhaps you can swing it. Undoubtedly someone will buy into it.

Tags: Getty-Images, Wall-Street, Non-organic, Stock, Earnings, Long Tail, Premium, Images, ASP, Adobe, Stock, Super-Store

A Puffer Fish is a fish that blows itself up to dramatically change its appearance and size: not unlike Getty-Images (GYI), Corbis and Jupiter-Images (JUPM) in the imaging market. All three have hybrid business models that disguise the money they really make in the exchange of digital photography. But we know better, we've analyzed empirical data and studied their reports carefully.

That does not mean these "Three Bandits" are failures: Getty-Images is very successful as a photography agency (doing about $805M in revenues per year), Corbis is a very rich catalog of historic photographs stashed away in a bunker in Pennsylvania, slowly being digitized at a cost of about $25 per photograph (revenues around $250M). Jupiter-Images is the division of JupiterMedia, formerly a magazine publishing and events company, now morphing into a content acquisition company.

But they are not a successes either. Organic growth of these companies is well below the growth of the image exchange market and their combined market share is less than 10% of the image exchange addressable market. So, while the $1.5B asking price for Getty-Images doesn't sound outrageous (less than 2x revenues), what you're buying is an outsourced photography agency. Getty-Images is in essence a people factory with ever eroding profit margins.

Twenty years ago Getty-Images started with a $20M investment from grandpa Getty and has continued to purchased a wide array of photo agencies (hence the Puffer Fish) and large libraries of photographs that over time become stale rather than increase in value. The average sales price of those, primarily editorial, photographs is declining steadily (more so than creative photography), leaving the company with a large family of complacent celebrity photographers and mainstream content only the a select few publishing agencies are interested in.

With publishers (of all kind) looking for original content, the imaging Super Store approach (as described here) from the Three Bandits is fundamentally flawed. But the reason why we don't believe in the longevity of their business models (and their asking price) is that they ignore and suppress the massive influx of new digital photographers that create phenomenal high quality and original content most publishers would be dying to get their hands on.

So anyone buying these companies will soon find out how small Puffer Fish really are.

Tags: Getty-Images, Corbis, Jupiter-images, PE Week, Wall-Street, PE Week, Images, Revenues, Stock, Super-Store, Cameras

I have received quite a few comments on my previous post (like this) on the imaging marketplace and I am making an attempt to clarify my condensed writing.

The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.

A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).

A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.

Tags: Getty-Images, Corbis, Jupiter-images, Photography, puffer fish, Photographers, Margin, Editorial, Super-Store

Two weeks ago Digital Railroad (a private digital photo aggregator, funded by Venrock and Morgenthaler) announced it was restructuring, cutting half of its employees and repositioning the company into a photo marketplace. Today Getty Images (GYI) is said to be looking for a buyer at around $1.5B, after its stock price is unable to recover for more than two years. And Corbis, well -- Corbis is being kept afloat by Bill Gates. Swallowing stock photography companies as fast as it can is Jupiter Images' attempt to boost its potential acquisition price, a strategy that didn't work so well for Getty Images. So, why are these companies not growing organically while the dSLR market that produces those images is growing 60% YTY and GMV of the image market is north of $22B.

Here is my take: the imaging markets consists of demi-cartels that produce "premium" supply that does not meet the requirements of an ever growing and changing market of buyers. No longer is the size of the buyer's market dictated by agencies nor is the new seller's market defined by the old definition of pro-photographers. As a result sell side content does not find enough buyers and the only way to make money is to make sellers believe that if their work is good enough, it will sell.....nice promise. Out of desperation most photographers post their images on multiple websites to get maximum visibility, a true testament of an inefficient market.

Getty Images is really a hybrid business, it has about 3,000 photographers on staff and does editorial projects for its main customers and in armored trucks if it needs to, providing news worthy photography on location. The side-business of Getty is the stock photography business which yields ever declining average sales prices for royalty free and rights managed photography. So, in essence, Getty Images was trying to become a "record" company with its own supply while on the side playing the independent party with a transparent image store; i.e. the "free-market" supply is competing with Getty's core business model. Over the years, many photographers have complained of unfair practices that gives better treatment to Getty's images than to the supply from individual photographers.

The Digital Photography market is in the same state as the music industry (albeit condensed in time) , premium supply doesn't turn out to be premium, demand has changed and the "record" companies in this space have no other option but to erode their premier status business model. I was right three years ago, let that be noted.

As for Digital Railroad, I doubt that they'll develop the macro-economic strategies that determine the success of any real "free-market" marketplace at this point. It would take a sizable investment in technology to turn a super-store into a "free-market". Adobe is rumored to be working on an image marketplace, but here too, the devil is in the details.

We don't need another Amazon.com of the photography business but a real free-market in which YOU the photographer and buyer make decisions on what transactions you want to engage in.

Tags: Getty-Images, Premium, Corbis, Jupiter-images, Digital Railroad, Amazon, Photographers, Monolithic, Free-market, Long Tail

Bose is a great example of a company that delivers a unique experience. I have had a few after sales experiences with Bose and they've all been very positive and consistent. Most recently I purchased the new iPhone adapter for Bose's QuietComfort 2 Noise Canceling headphone, only to find out that the adapter didn't fit my QC2 headset. After a call into Bose, we found out that 2 versions of the QC2 exist and the adapter packaging did not specify this distinction.

Clearly I was an early adopter of their Noise Canceling technology (I also own the QC1) but they did not punish me for it. With a little bit of tugging they offered to replace my 4-year old headset with a brand new set for free. Gladly my new headset arrived before a 5 hour plane ride to the east coast. Another experience like this with Bose came when I moved from Europe to the US about 12 years ago, I wanted to exchange my 901 equalizer with a 110 volt one (so I did not need to down-convert my 220 volt european equalizer). Again, here Bose offered to replace the equalizer free of charge.

Whether you like the sound of Bose is your own decision, but the flexibility of this, still private company to balance earnings with a sincere interest in keeping its customers happy is admirable. More fundamentally, successful companies understand that building a lasting brand means they pay attention to customer retention. Apple is doing similar things by turning part of their retail store into a support center. Great businesses don't look at support as a cost center but as a way to satisfy customer experience and have them coming back for more.

Tags: Digital Railroad, Getty-Images, Corbis, Jupiter-images, Premium, Photography, Amazon, Adobe, Stock

Photo-editing today is still an art form, a specialized and necessary art - and "endured" by prosumers. The great photography you see hanging on walls, on websites or in magazines, all have been edited digitally. Not necessarily to create some outrageous creative effect but because not a single camera accurately captures what your eyes see. Not since the invention of photography in 1870.

Camera vendors promise better results when their customers purchase a more expensive dSLR (digital Single Lens Reflex) camera, a better lens, a solid tripod, a new filter, and, while we’re selling: a new photo bag. Yet, none of those products do anything to change the fundamental difference between what your eyes see and what the camera produces. With a healthy growth of more than 60% worldwide in dSLR sales (according to new 2007 numbers from CIPA), most camera vendors are not in a hurry to out-innovate themselves as their current stance is feeding their business so well. So, the problem remains, camera output is far from ideal.

So today, the great results photographers strive for can really only be achieved through editing, reproducing what you tried to capture. That editing today happens primarily on the desktop (less than 10% of the whole photography market edits online) and by digital SLR users with a great sense of quality and aesthetics. Products are plentiful, such as Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Lightroom, Apple Aperture and my favorite: LightZone. Yet none of those products completely hide photographic complexity to its new users; the massive numbers of dSLR buyers that just want to create great photographs.

Photo-editing should work like a car, simply put the key in the ignition and drive (without having to worry about how the engine and the transmission works). The editing tool of the future should embed the photographic knowledge and make decisions or recommendations for you, rather than requiring its users to become proficient in the minutiae of color and light. Just like a car, photo editing should be able to go where others have gone before, enriching the experience of new users on a continuous basis. New editing techniques should be sharable through a language we all understand, a photograph. In short: edit "like-Mike" and me-too editing is born.

I believe photo-editing will move away from what it is today, a basket full of technology tools to a service through which the sharing of editing techniques will enable the new "language" of photo-editing. That dramatically simplified language will subsequently enable editing for the long-tail of the photography market, the massive market of point-and-shooters. New technologies such as Pixenate, Picnik, Adobe Photoshop Express already rush to deliver a new basket of tools for the consumer market. And many others will follow.

Today, plenty of opportunities remain in the prosumer editing space in which no vendor has amassed even close to 30% penetration. New editing capabilities are bound to drive the marketplace in which monetization of photographs and, eventually a free-market for photography can flourish.

What's left for the innovative camera vendor is to build a proprietary imaging pipeline that dramatically reduces the need to edit. With 90% of dSLR vendors using the same imaging pipeline (behind the sensor) the time is right to change the way a camera captures data before it reaches the sensor. In the same way your eyes do very smart tricks before light hits the retina.

Tags: IBM, Palo Alto, Apple, Blackberry, Amazon, Palm, IPhone, Experience, Design, Brand

Many times I am asked to help a foreign (usually European) company to make it in the United States. But the pursuit of the American dream requires that sacrifices be made. Everyone wants to be a star like Elvis Presley, yet few have the real determination to do so.

So, why are US companies so different. The internet is releasing the fictional boundaries of technology, making its usage and its future development available to anyone. Universities in Europe are doing a much better job teaching technology, yet we don't see a significant amount of European companies become successful. What is going on?

While I don't have all the answers, I can offer a few personal observations of why the American way - and - dream is alive and well:

1/ More entrepreneurs are bred by a capitalistic society than a socialistic society. Entrepreneurs with a personal stake and drive for success boost investor deal flow and premium supply. A significantly larger investor pool yields higher valuations for premium supply.

2/ Solid early-stage business acumen. While technology and programming skills can be acquired by virtually anyone, the European petri-dish, the ecosystem that supports the early-stage exchange of technology products and services is missing. As a result people with the business skills needed to bring those early stage products to market rapidly is virtually non-existent in Europe.

3/ Resilient attitude. Young Americans (and ex-pats like me who never felt at "home") are taught to make money and make themselves happy, young Europeans are taught to get a job at a reputable company and be happy. Taking risk and thinking different is a requirement of being a successful entrepreneur, in addition to withstanding a great amount of adversity.

4/ More risk-taking buyers. Customers, partners and acquirers are more entrepreneurial too. Aggressive competitive cultures force buyers to be more entrepreneurial. Technology innovation is accepted as the instrument of differentiation in many US businesses and customers will buy products that give them competitive edge and better quality-of-service.

5/ Continuous focus. Focus on success, short and long. Building a business that goes through several transformations to meet continuous market milestones is crucial to success, rather than a formal majestic plan with many dependencies that never materializes.

So, is there no hope for foreign technologists? Au contraire, I've seen some great technologies that, if unlocked, can find early traction and impressive valuations. It's time to judge a technology not by the country it comes from but the content of its innovation. The american dream is waiting for you. Are you up for the ride?

[In remembrance of Martin Luther King]

Tags: LightZone, Apple, Adobe, SLR, Free-market, Photography, Photoshop

To quote Walt Mossberg of the Wall Street Journal at Consumer Technology Ventures last week, quality is an important pillar of success for consumer products and I couldn't agree more. Many times products are hyped with incredible promise (marketing) but the product either doesn't work as advertised, requires other services to be activated or simply is not ready (does Zune ring a bell).

From that perspective I am less happy that Apple (the only PC platform I have ever bought), is gaining popularity. Price pressure and popularity does not always do wonders to quality.

I currently use a 2-year old Powerbook G4 1.5Ghz of which the fan (right after the one year warranty expired) makes a noise like a sawing machine, and I had to reduce the speed of the processor to keep the fans from cooling. For work I purchased a $999 23-inch Apple flat-panel that produces stunning image quality and brightness, yet the ghosting of images on this expensive piece of equipment allows me to see which window was there 5 minutes ago. I expect the best from Apple and I am willing to pay a premium, but I am not willing to pay a premium for under-par quality.

Now, I am not picking on Apple because it is the worst performer in the consumer space, quite the opposite. Apple undoubtedly is the best performer in the business, but given that, Walt's comments make even more sense to me. Switching off of Apple is not an option for me, but griping is.

Update:
After unscrewing at least 20 screws on my out-of-warranty Powerbook G4 (directions courtesy of iFixit), I discovered that the reason why I had reduced the processor speed on my laptop for over one year and avoid the fan from coming on was created by, get this: a quality control sticker in the fan compartment that had come loose and was spinning along with the fan. A simple removal of the sticker solved the issue.

Tags: Electronic Arts, Gaming, Xbox, Microsoft, Sony, Apple, Entertainment

Last week I sat in at a VC panel and the general partners from a few early stage VC firms who agreed that founders should have deep and many years of domain expertise in the companies that they are investing in. I disagree.

For one, true disruptive innovation does not come from compliance to an existing market. Apple, as a pure technology company, has proven it does not need to be a content expert to take the music business for a spin, and a massive overhaul. Real innovation starts with a healthy skepticism about current markets and its tactics. Coming up with new approaches to make money, and fundamentally changing the workings of paralyzed markets, is what makes my heart tick.

In my career I've always taken the disruptive standpoint. I became one of the most successful media experts for Oracle, not because of my prior domain expertise: I had none, but because of my drive to disrupt and look at the issues from a different perspective, one that is not necessarily tied to common acceptance. Finding and believing in OuterBay Technologies when it was unpopular and (yet) unsuccessful and creating a new market segment no industry analyst had heard of and starting immergo video communications without prior video communications knowledge and signing up big brand customers like IDG, blowing existing 20 year old production companies away, are living proof of why domain expertise is over-rated. SoftKinetic, the company I just became the CEO of, enables the next disruption in home entertainment no-one has t