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Cheating platforms; bad for our country
When Facebook decided to integrate new application capabilities that were first available as a third-party application from a marketplace participant, they broke the cardinal rule of marketplace meritocracy. When Getty Images’ staff-photographers allegedly took new pictures similar to previously top-selling pictures from participants they too broke a fundamental marketplace rule. When Amazon.com optimized sales results based on margins requirements they too broke many of the free-market rules as described in “Look, but don’t touch”.
By calling themselves platforms or marketplaces those companies misled their participants and engaged in what I would characterize as false advertising. Not only did the suppliers expect to be treated equally and become successful based on a true meritocracy, buyers expected to get an untainted view of that meritocracy to make informed purchasing decisions.
Technology platforms need to obey to a simple macro-economic marketplace definition:
A marketplace connects unrestricted supply with unrestricted demand through an un-arbitrated and transparent exchange.
Marketplaces thrive because they support free-market principles, and as a result they level the playing field for all participants. No longer are unfair advantages for participants defined by geographic location, subscriptions, volume or other artificial boundaries, but simply by the value and the price of their products.
Here is what platform vendors, to maintain free-market principles and thrive, should stick to:
1/ Don’t employ sales people that sell marketplace content. Sales people give preference to specific content which violates the integrity of the marketplace. Sell the effectiveness of the marketplace mechanism instead.
2/ Don’t market specific content, but market the effectiveness of the exchange. Unfair advantage is an attribute of a premium market not a free-market.
3/ Don’t arbitrate. Anyone should be able to participate, participation fees (that anone in the target group can afford) are okay.
4/ Don’t hide sales results. Transparency of the effectiveness of the marketplace is crucial to invite new entrants on the supply and buy side.
5/ Don’t participate in the marketplace yourself. Clearly seperate yourself from the participants, platform vendors should just build the platform, not the content.
Technology companies that are building platforms should check out our cardinal marketplace rules and investors should measure their platform companies on the compliance to those rules. Investing in a premium market business is fundamentally different from investing in a free-market platform business. Funding requirements and use-of-proceeds differ dramatically.
I’ll make the point again that investors should understand macro-economics impact before they invest.
Marketplaces are not for-free and still support capitalism, but the money will be made by platform owners from a transparent margin on the exchange (and sometimes carefully applied advertising opportunities). Diligent consumer marketplaces achieve winner-takes-all participation levels and massive exchange volumes and revenues. eBay and the Apple AppStore are great examples of more disciplined marketplaces.
Because of the virtually unlimited global reach of the Internet we have an incredible opportunity and obligation to present the world with free-market platforms that treat all participants fairly and with respect.
Let’s stop whining about the authenticity of our presidents, and instead, as the creators of the technology industry show the world how we turn authenticity, embedded in our technology, into a massively sustainable advantage.
Comments
Why Amazon is not a marketplace
March 17, 2008. Target Audience: Macro
If you've read my previous blog on marketplace rules, you would agree. Amazon.com is a Super Store which, by expanding the relationship with other premium suppliers mimics the appearance of a marketplace. And because Jeff Bezos associates Amazon.com with a marketplace frequently, I stand to correct him:
Marketplace rules.
Rule #1: Failed. Amazon limits the supplier participation to their premium strategy.
Rule #2: Failed. Limited suppliers means limited transactions are available
Rule #3: Failed. Amazon regulates the process of how a transaction takes place, conforming to Amazon pricing models
Rule #4: Failed. Once you book an order from a different supplier than Amazon, all bets are off with regards to transparency, shipping, returns etc
Rule #5: Failed. There is no way for new buyers to see who bought what at what price and equally for sellers who sold what.
Rule #6: Failed. User opinions are irrelevant if they are not borne out of a transaction.
Rule #7: Perhaps not relevant here.
Rule #8: Failed. Amazon is "competing" in the "marketplace" with its suppliers
Amazon will have a much harder time to sustain growth and meet Wall Street expectations, as a lot of growth through premium suppliers will become non-organic (or sell through revenues). Amazon has plenty of opportunity to migrate to a real marketplace without losing its footing, but it better hurry. In the meantime, Jeff, please call Amazon what it is: earth's premium selection.
Marketplace rules: look, don't touch
March 16, 2008. Target Audience: Macro | Entrepreneur
By Georges van Hoegaerden
There is a lot of misconception about marketplaces and I wanted to summarize my response to benefit more entrepreneurs.
Real marketplaces are much more powerful than just a collection of stores. Amazon, for example is a Super Store not a marketplace today. EBay, FaceBook and YouTube represent more fundamental marketplace principles - and as a result - fascinating growth.
Marketplaces are a favorite topic these days, perhaps spawned by sky high valuations for social-media platforms such as FaceBook and Bebo. A social-media platform, you know, is nothing more than a marketplace in which personal attributes are traded (through the use of social applications).
Marketplaces are interesting because, if implemented successfully, provide massive user adoption and winner-takes-all leadership positions. Great traits for any investment portfolio. A marketplace is highly disruptive in a market where the premium opportunity, the Super Store model has been exhausted - or simply does not exist. Some markets, because of their highly fragmented nature, cannot be captured by high margin and proprietary access and a marketplace is the only way to leverage its total size.
I have written extensively about marketplace criteria in specific markets and its origination about 600 years back, so I won't cover that specifically here. But so many other markets are ripe for marketplace macro-economics delivered by technology. Virtually any market characterized by unique transactions between large amounts of sellers and buyers is a candidate for free-market principles. The life-cycle of proprietary markets is dramatically shortened by the Internet, a distribution medium that instantly removes artificial boundaries such as geographic location and limited access.
Here are 8 rules that make a marketplace succeed:
1/ Un-arbitrated participation
No seller or buyer should be banned from participating in the marketplace. A key fundamental of a marketplace is that it grows itself and that the quality of the buyer and seller is a reflection of the market, not controlled by the market. After-all, the purpose is to connect The Long Tail of supply with The Long Tail of demand.
2/ Un-arbitrated transactions
Apart from exchanges that are illegal by law, no transactions should be banned. People come to a marketplace to perform a unique transaction, one they could not act on in a premium market.
3/ Free pricing mechanisms
Pricing models and terms are defined either by the seller or buyer or by both. Not by the marketplace. Pricing models can include such transactions as sell, auction, reverse auction or subscription - or even a combination of those. Pricing, including free, is completely and independently determined by or between seller and buyer, predetermined or negotiated. The marketplace takes a simple transaction fee off of the transaction value.
4/ Predictable behavior
Marketplaces need to establish trust in order to survive and thrive. Pricing models and behavior of the marketplace need to be predictable and follow (not dictate) the goals of buyers and sellers. The marketplace should follow the needs of the market not the other way around.
5/ Transparency of transactions
Marketplaces rely on a vast new influx of sellers and buyers to grow to massive size. That means the marketplace must operate with a transparency that shows new buyers or sellers how to become successful as most of its users are greenfield participants.
6/ Meritocracy builds reputation
Trading favors and segmentation can be established but only based on mechanisms that are derived from real transactions, not plainly from user opinions. Opinions are useless if not supported by a proven reputation within the marketplace. Transactions based reputations provides long-lasting stickiness to the marketplace.
7/ Support for intermediaries
For existing markets moving from premium to a free-market, its existing intermediaries need to be able to continue to represent their sellers or buyers. A new technology marketplace should not want to disintermediate or alienate those agents.
8/ Non-compete
The marketplace cannot itself participate in the marketplace by providing its own transactions or even participate in - or act on behalf of - transactions between sellers and buyers. Apart from the fact that the business models don't jive, a marketplace cannot be trusted when it simultaneously participates and facilitates an impartial exchange.
So, a simple method to determine whether a marketplace has massive market potential is to hold it up against the rules provided here. These rules are macro-economic principles that dictate how markets behave and grow, the technology implementation must support those principles to have a chance of making it big. It's a free world after all.
There is a lot of misconception about marketplaces and I wanted to summarize my response to benefit more entrepreneurs.
Real marketplaces are much more powerful than just a collection of stores. Amazon, for example is a Super Store not a marketplace today. EBay, FaceBook and YouTube represent more fundamental marketplace principles - and as a result - fascinating growth.
Marketplaces are a favorite topic these days, perhaps spawned by sky high valuations for social-media platforms such as FaceBook and Bebo. A social-media platform, you know, is nothing more than a marketplace in which personal attributes are traded (through the use of social applications).
Marketplaces are interesting because, if implemented successfully, provide massive user adoption and winner-takes-all leadership positions. Great traits for any investment portfolio. A marketplace is highly disruptive in a market where the premium opportunity, the Super Store model has been exhausted - or simply does not exist. Some markets, because of their highly fragmented nature, cannot be captured by high margin and proprietary access and a marketplace is the only way to leverage its total size.
I have written extensively about marketplace criteria in specific markets and its origination about 600 years back, so I won't cover that specifically here. But so many other markets are ripe for marketplace macro-economics delivered by technology. Virtually any market characterized by unique transactions between large amounts of sellers and buyers is a candidate for free-market principles. The life-cycle of proprietary markets is dramatically shortened by the Internet, a distribution medium that instantly removes artificial boundaries such as geographic location and limited access.
Here are 8 rules that make a marketplace succeed:
1/ Un-arbitrated participation
No seller or buyer should be banned from participating in the marketplace. A key fundamental of a marketplace is that it grows itself and that the quality of the buyer and seller is a reflection of the market, not controlled by the market. After-all, the purpose is to connect The Long Tail of supply with The Long Tail of demand.
2/ Un-arbitrated transactions
Apart from exchanges that are illegal by law, no transactions should be banned. People come to a marketplace to perform a unique transaction, one they could not act on in a premium market.
3/ Free pricing mechanisms
Pricing models and terms are defined either by the seller or buyer or by both. Not by the marketplace. Pricing models can include such transactions as sell, auction, reverse auction or subscription - or even a combination of those. Pricing, including free, is completely and independently determined by or between seller and buyer, predetermined or negotiated. The marketplace takes a simple transaction fee off of the transaction value.
4/ Predictable behavior
Marketplaces need to establish trust in order to survive and thrive. Pricing models and behavior of the marketplace need to be predictable and follow (not dictate) the goals of buyers and sellers. The marketplace should follow the needs of the market not the other way around.
5/ Transparency of transactions
Marketplaces rely on a vast new influx of sellers and buyers to grow to massive size. That means the marketplace must operate with a transparency that shows new buyers or sellers how to become successful as most of its users are greenfield participants.
6/ Meritocracy builds reputation
Trading favors and segmentation can be established but only based on mechanisms that are derived from real transactions, not plainly from user opinions. Opinions are useless if not supported by a proven reputation within the marketplace. Transactions based reputations provides long-lasting stickiness to the marketplace.
7/ Support for intermediaries
For existing markets moving from premium to a free-market, its existing intermediaries need to be able to continue to represent their sellers or buyers. A new technology marketplace should not want to disintermediate or alienate those agents.
8/ Non-compete
The marketplace cannot itself participate in the marketplace by providing its own transactions or even participate in - or act on behalf of - transactions between sellers and buyers. Apart from the fact that the business models don't jive, a marketplace cannot be trusted when it simultaneously participates and facilitates an impartial exchange.
So, a simple method to determine whether a marketplace has massive market potential is to hold it up against the rules provided here. These rules are macro-economic principles that dictate how markets behave and grow, the technology implementation must support those principles to have a chance of making it big. It's a free world after all.
Imaging sales market broken from the top
By Georges van Hoegaerden
I have received quite a few comments on my previous post (like this) on the imaging marketplace and I am making an attempt to clarify my condensed writing.
The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.
A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).
A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.
I have received quite a few comments on my previous post (like this) on the imaging marketplace and I am making an attempt to clarify my condensed writing.
The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.
A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).
A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.
Image catalogs in peril
Two weeks ago Digital Railroad (a private digital photo aggregator, funded by Venrock and Morgenthaler) announced it was restructuring, cutting half of its employees and repositioning the company into a photo marketplace. Today Getty Images (GYI) is said to be looking for a buyer at around $1.5B, after its stock price is unable to recover for more than two years. And Corbis, well -- Corbis is being kept afloat by Bill Gates. Swallowing stock photography companies as fast as it can is Jupiter Images' attempt to boost its potential acquisition price, a strategy that didn't work so well for Getty Images. So, why are these companies not growing organically while the dSLR market that produces those images is growing 60% YTY and GMV of the image market is north of $22B.
Here is my take: the imaging markets consists of demi-cartels that produce "premium" supply that does not meet the requirements of an ever growing and changing market of buyers. No longer is the size of the buyer's market dictated by agencies nor is the new seller's market defined by the old definition of pro-photographers. As a result sell side content does not find enough buyers and the only way to make money is to make sellers believe that if their work is good enough, it will sell.....nice promise. Out of desperation most photographers post their images on multiple websites to get maximum visibility, a true testament of an inefficient market.
Getty Images is really a hybrid business, it has about 3,000 photographers on staff and does editorial projects for its main customers and in armored trucks if it needs to, providing news worthy photography on location. The side-business of Getty is the stock photography business which yields ever declining average sales prices for royalty free and rights managed photography. So, in essence, Getty Images was trying to become a "record" company with its own supply while on the side playing the independent party with a transparent image store; i.e. the "free-market" supply is competing with Getty's core business model. Over the years, many photographers have complained of unfair practices that gives better treatment to Getty's images than to the supply from individual photographers.
The Digital Photography market is in the same state as the music industry (albeit condensed in time) , premium supply doesn't turn out to be premium, demand has changed and the "record" companies in this space have no other option but to erode their premier status business model. I was right three years ago, let that be noted.
As for Digital Railroad, I doubt that they'll develop the macro-economic strategies that determine the success of any real "free-market" marketplace at this point. It would take a sizable investment in technology to turn a super-store into a "free-market". Adobe is rumored to be working on an image marketplace, but here too, the devil is in the details.
We don't need another Amazon.com of the photography business but a real free-market in which YOU the photographer and buyer make decisions on what transactions you want to engage in.
The Long Tail Continues
July 21, 2005. Target Audience: Entrepreneur
| Venture
Capitalist
By Georges van Hoegaerden
At The Long Tail Churchill Club event this morning Chris Anderson (Wired Editor in Chief and writer for the Economist), who claims ownership of the term, discussed his research and his upcoming book about The Long Tail. His speech reiterated some well understood findings at Amazon, Netflix, Rhapsody (all of which have been mentioned here before) as well as some esoteric analytical findings in which academia make an attempt to approximate the outcome of Long Tail markets with formulas. The Q&A session lead us into some of the business impacts of Long Tail markets. First he agreed with us, no business should create a Long Tail without a Torso. Second, new search technology customized to every individual usage (vertical search) is essential. Third, new "Taste-makers" of the world or micro-celebrities, vocalized by blogging about niche expertise, will fuel and direct the trust in The Long Tail. Meritocracy with democratic production. Interesting example mentioned was Lego, the toy company that changed its conservative marketing strategy (Pareto based) into a community marketing strategy, realizing better segmentation and margins can be derived from its very loyal community that continues to grow.
Our stance: Long Tail markets can succeed if:
1) The Torso exists and is successful in drawing the crowd
2) Long Tail demand is fed through Long Tail supply, creating a free-market
3) Arbitration is "owned" by the marketplace (not the company)
4) The marketplace offers sufficient transparency, to allow for discovery, not just search
5) The business behind the marketplace makes money on distribution (not aggregation)
6) The marketplace offers integrity, in pricing, use and abuse prevention
Read on for more information on The Long Tail in this blog series...
At The Long Tail Churchill Club event this morning Chris Anderson (Wired Editor in Chief and writer for the Economist), who claims ownership of the term, discussed his research and his upcoming book about The Long Tail. His speech reiterated some well understood findings at Amazon, Netflix, Rhapsody (all of which have been mentioned here before) as well as some esoteric analytical findings in which academia make an attempt to approximate the outcome of Long Tail markets with formulas. The Q&A session lead us into some of the business impacts of Long Tail markets. First he agreed with us, no business should create a Long Tail without a Torso. Second, new search technology customized to every individual usage (vertical search) is essential. Third, new "Taste-makers" of the world or micro-celebrities, vocalized by blogging about niche expertise, will fuel and direct the trust in The Long Tail. Meritocracy with democratic production. Interesting example mentioned was Lego, the toy company that changed its conservative marketing strategy (Pareto based) into a community marketing strategy, realizing better segmentation and margins can be derived from its very loyal community that continues to grow.
Our stance: Long Tail markets can succeed if:
1) The Torso exists and is successful in drawing the crowd
2) Long Tail demand is fed through Long Tail supply, creating a free-market
3) Arbitration is "owned" by the marketplace (not the company)
4) The marketplace offers sufficient transparency, to allow for discovery, not just search
5) The business behind the marketplace makes money on distribution (not aggregation)
6) The marketplace offers integrity, in pricing, use and abuse prevention
Read on for more information on The Long Tail in this blog series...
No Long Tail without a Torso
June 24, 2005. Target Audience: Entrepreneur
| Venture
Capitalist
By Georges van Hoegaerden
Investors are getting flooded with Long Tail startups. The Long Tail is the well documented phenomenon in which Amazon.com makes more money in selling books that are not(!) in the top 10,000 and creates controversy about traditional sales principles. Hundreds of examples exist before the introduction of the internet. But the Long Tail really only exists when there is a body attached to it. You go to Amazon because you find the most well known books, then you'll explore its creative variety. The body represents the highly targeted top quality that draws in the audience in the first place. So stop pitching Long Tails, where you rely on some undefined creative variety. Focus on making your numbers in the identifiable market, then benefit from the Long Tail to expand your selection beyond the traditional and constricted marketplace. More on the Long Tail here.
Investors are getting flooded with Long Tail startups. The Long Tail is the well documented phenomenon in which Amazon.com makes more money in selling books that are not(!) in the top 10,000 and creates controversy about traditional sales principles. Hundreds of examples exist before the introduction of the internet. But the Long Tail really only exists when there is a body attached to it. You go to Amazon because you find the most well known books, then you'll explore its creative variety. The body represents the highly targeted top quality that draws in the audience in the first place. So stop pitching Long Tails, where you rely on some undefined creative variety. Focus on making your numbers in the identifiable market, then benefit from the Long Tail to expand your selection beyond the traditional and constricted marketplace. More on the Long Tail here.
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