By Georges van Hoegaerden



Some people do not understand why I do what I do and why I bother, and underestimate my determination to fix Venture Capital. Certainly there are much easier ways to make money than to pursue the obliteration of an investment cartel, in which seemingly everyone belongs to the club. And some people's actions are distorted by my critical views of what goes on in Silicon Valley, and the increasing popularity of my views may slow down the chase for money that is dished out often so irresponsibly.

My story

Let me tell you who you are talking to when you ask me to give up. My story may also answer the irritable question "who is this guy" I overheard recently. I do want you to know who I am, and how I care about this country. My story is more than just a bunch of business titles slapped together. Ready?

I was born in The Netherlands, the youngest of three boys in a family with a lifelong teacher as a dad, and a gentler mother working to place elderly people in geriatric facilities built by the government. With our parents coming home late from work us three boys literally fought it out everyday. To get to or from school first after a one hour bike ride every day (rain or shine, in Holland that meant rain more often than shine), playing in tennis (while co-founding our new club) and basketball leagues, finishing our dinners first every evening or claiming the window seat in the back of the family car. Everything back then was a competition, and as the youngest I got the brunt of the attempted suppression. Silly stuff, but it honed our skills to compete and I became very good at it.

My Dad was an educated man without much empathy, as most men born his age were (see the Mad Men TV series on AMC). I got my interest in science from him, but not much else. His vast knowledge never seemed to extrapolate to reality and he made his frustrations trickle down to everyone around him. At age seven I realized my life with him was going to be short lived. I never wanted to become him or be around him. I learned from him an important lesson I am sure he did not intend to instill; how to ignore negative pressure. I left the house at around eighteen, the first of the three boys and never looked back. After a shaky start I blossomed.

My Mom was quite the opposite. Friendly, outgoing and always ready to support her children in whatever way she could. I remember vividly the many conversations we had as she put me to bed and we covered the important topics of the day. My love and respect for women grew out of that experience. My Mom's weakness was to let my Dad get away with too much, and nurtured her "blind" devotion often to the detriment of herself.

The most positive influence in my life was the patriarch of the family, my grandfather (my Mom's Dad). A self-made man he became a majestic business figure as one of the co-founders of "van Melle", the company that made the ever so popular Mentos candy (sold a couple of years ago to an italian confectionary) and the generous man who gave us, what we as children then thought of as worthless pieces of paper, real shares in "van Melle" and "Royal Dutch Shell" for our milestone birthdays. He had clear opinions and voiced them when provoked, but he was humble at the same time, always asking the factory workers for permission to test the candy from one of "their" machines. He could laugh at himself, remained a rebel and kept everyone in the family in check. Nobody knew how much money he had until he died. The merit of his actions stayed with us much longer than his few words.

I came to the U.S. on my own with some hard earned chunk of change in my pocket, invited by Marc Benioff (now Salesforce.com CEO, then Oracle VP) and Larry Ellison (Oracle's CEO) who wondered why I was able to sell their (then) emerging products while they couldn't. The difference between my approach and theirs was the business model, to which the new managers I was asked to report to had no clue, let alone respect. I left Oracle with fond memories as soon as my green-card was approved and jumped in Silicon Valley hoping to find more intelligence there. My first startup was a group of consultants with a horrible business plan, and I told them about my opinions in a way only I can. Instead of fleeing, they came back and asked for guidance (management incubation). We turned the company into a product company and raised a double digit series-A post 9/11. The company was sold in 2006 for triple digits. As a board member my encounters with Venture Capitalists quickly made me question their catalytic value. I went on to build a few other successful companies and had a brief part-time stint on the "dark side". A clear pattern of defunct VC governance and execution started to emerge.

To sum it up, I was brought up with an understanding of how to compete, how to separate rhetoric from reality, how to ignore distortion fields, how to be devoted to a cause, how to be clear in your convictions, how to do what you say, how to relentlessly pursue your goals, and how to do what is right even in the face of opposing popularity and extreme controversy. But most of all, I never bought into nonsense, not even when that nonsense is supported by the masses.

I put in my time to get to know every business I was in, and earned my way into becoming a systems manager, computer programmer, IT director, pre-sales engineer, marketeer, entrepreneur, serial CEO, Venture Catalyst and Venture Capitalist along the way. Nothing was handed to me (my parents decided to use my shares to pay for the private education they felt I needed), and my real world experience continues to be a priceless "bull shit" detector in every new endeavor I engaged in. After thirty years in technology (ignited by my addiction for the HP-41C) of which fifteen years in Venture, I have witnessed the workings of the Venture business like no other.

The importance of this story is not to emphasize a purported "micro celebrity status" but to highlight my convictions, as convictions drive consistent and persistent behavior. Everyone has a story like this and staying true to the convictions that are shaped by the past makes for more authentic human beings, and a more natural fit to our contributions in society.

Perhaps my story will help you understand why the odds of building great performance in Venture that will save entrepreneurialism are in my favor. My background including fifteen years of first hand Venture experience in Silicon Valley begs me to unleash the financial choke-chain around the innovator's neck.

Silicon Valley needs help from above

The startling revelation, as proven out by the empirical evidence I have delivered for quite some time now is that according to a renowned money manager 95% of Venture Capital (VC) firms are not making any consistent money for their investors (Limited Partners). And that means Silicon Valley is at the brink of a serious implosion. Imagine what would happen if only about 35 of 790 VC firms were to survive in ten years from now.

Alarm bells should be going off by now, but few appear to be paying attention. Why not, you say?

Well, much of the money pumped into VC firms comes from Institutional Investors (pension funds, endowments, insurance companies etc.) with bulk loads of cash reserves they want to put to work. They dedicate a predetermined amount (usually by board consent), between 10% and 15% of those reserves to alternative investments of which a portion is then allocated to Venture Capital. To make a long story short, a tiny portion of assets from Limited Partners (even the non-institutional ones) is devoted specifically to Venture and a loss or break-even of less than 5% of total assets does not evoke a lot of emotion. Hence optimization discussions with Limited Partners about Venture turn with the agility of a big freight ship.

The alarm bells are getting muffled even more. Institutional Investors have built majestic constructs supporting the deployment of their Venture Capital assets. Many invest in Venture Capital through fund-of-funds with a "specialization" in alternative assets, a fuzzy term for anything that is not mainstream. And thus the actual performance of Venture is hidden behind the performance of the grab-bag of other financial instruments that resides in those fund-of-funds.

And it gets worse, VC firms themselves have been allowed to diversify their risk by embedding alternative investment strategies within the firm, and in worst cases even within the same fund. In short, Institutional Investors have stacked derivative, upon derivative, upon derivative (with of course zero marketplace transparency) and appear surprised performance of Venture Capital has lost the fantastic upside that made them all want to get in some 20 years ago.

And the mess does not end there. The mushy multi-tier asset allocation constructs allowed many General Partners entry to the Venture Capital business who have no credentials of being there. Their lack of experience and foresight has turned into fear and with it the implementation of Venture Capital risk has turned predominantly subprime. As a result Venture Capital risk has produced over the last ten years no more than micro Private Equity returns (less than 10% IRR), squandered about $1.7 Trillion in funds and eroded public trust in companies that never had any social economic value to begin with.

That fear from inexperienced General Partners in VC firms further exhibits itself by the deployment of 10 levels of diversification of risk when a VC firm makes an investment into a startup. Extreme fragmentation of assets and risk protects VC downside (making good money off management fees for 12 years) more than it protects upside, and thus Limited Partners are poised to lose out again, regardless of the economic circumstances. Improper deployment of risk cannot be mitigated by economic recovery.

Venture needs a reinvention from the top. But who cares?

Who cares?

Everyone in or around Venture should. The worst thing that can happen to a sector is that investors stop caring, and many have. Many Limited Partners will not renew their commitments and simply get out, and allocate their 5% of Venture Capital elsewhere. A speaker at a recent conference claimed the demise in VC firms to be as large as 30% over the last 10 years, with as much as 50% of venture folks already affected. New Limited Partners to the sector I speak with simply see no reason for getting in, given its deplorable performance.

And Venture Capitalists don't seem to care too much because ten years of a cushy management fee from a sizable fund with no way for the public to establish their merit gets them setup for life quite comfortably. Under the cloud of economic insecurity and with micro private equity returns in hand, it is still easier to raise another fund (and thus another ten years of fees) than to admit that not the economy is at fault, but their deployment of risk in it. Many idiot Limited Partners have fallen for their arguments again and Venture continues to spiral further down the slippery subprime slope it has been on for a while. To VC, survival of the fittest has turned into survival of the shrewdest. Or as a General Partner from Sequoia Capital allegedly stated: "We used to have a club, now we just club each other".

But the real impact of all this ignorance has already affected entrepreneurialism. Defunct VC governance has led to a dumbed down investment thesis that will only attract entrepreneurs that submit to that thesis. Hence the quality of innovation that surfaces is limited by the quality of the thesis that is projected. Subprime entrepreneurs, willing to be enslaved by subprime VC governance continue to tear down the potential of social economic value groundbreaking innovation is supposed to ignite.

Today, glorified programmers and VCs are the inexperienced partners in a dance that only a small audience (not the public) wants to attend.

Opportunity cares

With 80% of the world's population still not having access to meaningful technology applications, the opportunity to spawn new groundbreaking innovations remains enormous. Technology adoption keeps growing, even when Venture Capital declines in its ability to govern worthy innovation. So, the opportunity dictates that there is much more room for Venture Capital firms to grow, just not for ones that cannot establish a proper investment thesis of innovation.

Governance of innovation is improperly aligned with the opportunity of innovation, and thus any calculation of the size or number of VC firms based on its current workings is witchcraft, irrelevant and inaccurate (up or down) by default.

There is no valid reason why 100 VC firms with a single $100M fund cannot generate a six times return each, except for the improper deployment of risk. Certainly the gaping opportunity in technology dictates that there is also no reason why the total number of Venture firms in the U.S. could not reach 1,000.

The grim impact of doing nothing

The most powerful assets in the Venture ecosystem (see our Venture Primer) are the many entrepreneurs with groundbreaking ideas we have bred in this country. Yet, those outliers of innovation have systemically been ignored by a dumb financial system that favors those willing to be enslaved by subprime risk. Groundbreaking entrepreneurs have already left the party and quickly become extinct. Lured by lucrative offers they chose to find solace with better custodians of innovation, larger yet agile companies that simply took better care. Many returned home to their country of origin with an Ivy League diploma in their pockets. Silicon Valley, for what it once represented, has begun to implode.

With more than 50% of moneys spent in certain areas of Silicon Valley dedicated to startups, a 90% erosion of that money (from cutting down the systemic underperformance of 95% of VC firms and retrenching of disappointed Limited Parters) leads to an estimated 45% decline in overall jobs. That in turn creates massive economic deflation to the region and exemplifies why governmental intervention without fundamental reform (the current band-aids will be circumvented quickly) of financial systems in Venture does nothing to prevent the slide it is on. Our local and federal governments should be all over this case, to prevent a further systemic slide that could turn California into a grave-yard for what has been, and our country from becoming the lost leader of innovation.

Our government has simply not connected the dots between systemic failure in Venture and systemic failures in the economy, just yet. The pain and destruction probably need to become more obvious first.

U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke did the usual politically correct thing by inviting members to his National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship with large statures in the old system, yet none in the new. The outcome of that exercise will be as expected, more of the same (yet no one will be able to politically accuse him). More importantly, Locke's agenda is flawed. The problems in Venture are not with the method of innovation, but with those who govern it.

Venture is the poster child for financial reform

As a reader of my blog, you may not be surprised to learn that the problems in Venture have nothing to do with some deep rooted and mysterious "Voodoo" of technology or innovation. We have an outdated financial system that does not need more regulations of its complexity, but a dramatic simplification and flattening of its marketplace behavior. The Venture business is the poster child for creating such a new financial system, as its current performance can nothing but improved on.

Innovation can only be saved by a financial system that is truly a free-market system, away from the existing cartel that offers no marketplace (transactional) transparency and is void of real competition that lies at the capitalistic fundamentals this country was founded on. Merit attached to money changes the bold lie capitalism is without.

So, my self-imposed journey to save America from itself continues, for I have seen its potential.

We can save the fantastic innovative capacity in this country and elsewhere when we apply the same intelligence of the way entrepreneurs build innovation to the way we fund it. Without a new free-market financial system in Venture be sure to strap in for a massive implosion in Venture that will take ten years for many to discover had been predicted by this annoying whistle blower all along.

At least now you know who he is.

Tags: Subprime, Limited Partners, Entrepreneurs, VC, Innovation, Integrity, Investment, Government, Growth, Arbitration, Capitalism, Cartel, Diversification, Economy, Experience, Free-market, Funds, HP, LP, Organic growth, Private Equity, Risk, SalesForce.com, Silicon Valley, SocialEconomicValue, Transparency, Venture, Oracle

By Georges van Hoegaerden


Is the little "fun fact" that occurred at the beginning of this year which Dick Kramlich, General Partner and co-founder at New Enterprise Associates inconspicuously threw into his acceptance speech of the special achievement award from IBF's Venture Capital Investment Conference last week. I told you so...

VC governance is broken

That is a serious message which rebuts all the relativity theories from Venture Capitalists (VCs) and highlights how broken Venture as a financial instrument really is. Especially in light of the fact that entrepreneurial activity according to the Kauffman Foundation is now higher than in any of the last 14 years and VC funds have been fully loaded with commitments from supportive LPs over the last ten years. Short term, even NASDAQ performance beats 2009 performance in Venture.

What it means is that in the marketplace of innovation in which supply and demand are performing well, the governor of innovation (the VC) failed to make financial sense and its arbitration fails to produce merit.

The Limited Partners (LPs) who unchanged keep pumping money in a decaying financial instrument truly deserve to be called Idiot LPs. But we do not want LPs to flee as technology venture remains a highly rewarding investment sector for LPs, just not with the current market model and the current financial derivative. Just because governance is broken does not mean the marketplace is.

Checks and balances

According to the panels at the event, the contraction of VCs has started and venture firms are down some 33% with practitioners down 30-50%. Funding rates are currently at about 900 companies per year, leaving about 3,000 companies with previous investments without extended funding runways. The risk profiles tumble further down the subprime slope with early rounds fetching about $1.5M and $70-90M exits on average. Heavy reliance on syndication is the model going forward and VCs are hoarding liquidity.

Even though net returns for investors (LPs) are missing some panel members predict (or wish) no fundamental change will occur. Many LPs unjustifiably appear afraid that if they turn the screws on VC too much, those VC will not let them participate in their next fund. With a new market model we are more than happy to find them more competent replacement for each. Many LPs just stay away from VC, 2x returns on $20M investments is not a great way to deploy Venture risk for many. No v-shape recovery in venture fundraising is expected anytime soon.

Better understanding of underlying assets

Many LPs appear more open to a "forensic analysis" of the Venture ecosystem (get it here), to better understand the asset class and be able to "touch" the companies to which assets are being deployed. Transparency issues are being discussed. Early stage investing requires a unique thesis and LPs are (eagerly) looking for them, with placement agencies sending many VC firms back to the drawing boards. Venture overhang is getting smaller, turnover in LPs is increasing. Empirical evidence of a recent $3B VC fund distributing only $100M back to the LPs makes the IRR's (Internal Rate of Return) calculations quickly lose their value in determining the health of the LP commitments. A stronger emphasis on money-in versus money-out is what now drives LP agendas moving forward.

Making sense

My observation from discussions with pension funds, private equity firms and treasuries is that many Limited Partners are confused. On one hand they want to get out because of unsatisfactory returns and on the other hand they do not want to miss out on the massive opportunity in Venture they know still lies ahead.

A conversation with an LP at the event brought home what that confusion looks like (forgive the brevity on either side, we both sat through the last panel session of a packed two day event - me lingering for a cocktail appointment with another LP).

...before the panel session...
LP: What do you do Georges?
Georges: I am a Venture Economist.
LP: Huh, what is that?
Georges: I help LPs make sense out of their venture strategies.
LP: We should talk.

...after the panel session...
LP (before we can leave the room): So tell me.
Georges: Venture cannot and will not perform using the current model.
LP: Well I know Venture is broken
Georges: Yes, but it is important to know the difference between a cancer and a fever.
LP: Fair enough, but I don't have a problem.
Georges: Really? So, why are we talking?
LP: Uh, I think it is broken too. But my returns were okay.
Georges: Really? You deployed Venture risk and you've gotten micro-Private Equity returns, why is that okay?
LP: Uh (blushing), you are right.

Finance is easy

It amazes me how common sense has prevented to enter the minds of LPs who (in some cases) continue to be swayed by convoluted fairytale stories of a better future. A solution to the Venture malaise needs to include not just a market-model that deploys Venture risk more appropriately, but should also include the canvassing of new general partners with the confidence and capabilities to produce merit in that new system. Both are included in my systemic fix to Venture, a prelude of which (the detection of the disease) can be found in 2010: The State of Venture Capital.

Obviously I will not paraphrase every discussion I have with LPs, and continue to treat them as the other asset holder (like entrepreneurs) in the Venture marketplace with the utmost respect. But LPs should not just listen to VC rhetoric and expect them to come up with fundamental improvements (or perhaps required cannibalization) in the Venture business that jeopardizes their cushy, no downside, protectionist stance. For LPs, I am the resource and the voice-of-reason for those who want to challenge "best-practices" of VCs that have not and will continue to fail to produce proper returns.

But, dear LP, if you aim your frustration with Venture at me instead of the VC, I will kick you out off my process for a much better future in Venture. After all, Venture performance is really your problem, not mine.

Tags: Limited Partners, VC, Venture, Marketplace, Funds, Fundraising, Arbitration

By Georges van Hoegaerden

At The Long Tail Churchill Club event this morning Chris Anderson (Wired Editor in Chief and writer for the Economist), who claims ownership of the term, discussed his research and his upcoming book about The Long Tail. His speech reiterated some well understood findings at Amazon, Netflix, Rhapsody (all of which have been mentioned here before) as well as some esoteric analytical findings in which academia make an attempt to approximate the outcome of Long Tail markets with formulas. The Q&A session lead us into some of the business impacts of Long Tail markets. First he agreed with us, no business should create a Long Tail without a Torso. Second, new search technology customized to every individual usage (vertical search) is essential. Third, new "Taste-makers" of the world or micro-celebrities, vocalized by blogging about niche expertise, will fuel and direct the trust in The Long Tail. Meritocracy with democratic production. Interesting example mentioned was Lego, the toy company that changed its conservative marketing strategy (Pareto based) into a community marketing strategy, realizing better segmentation and margins can be derived from its very loyal community that continues to grow.

Our stance: Long Tail markets can succeed if:
1) The Torso exists and is successful in drawing the crowd
2) Long Tail demand is fed through Long Tail supply, creating a free-market
3) Arbitration is "owned" by the marketplace (not the company)
4) The marketplace offers sufficient transparency, to allow for discovery, not just search
5) The business behind the marketplace makes money on distribution (not aggregation)
6) The marketplace offers integrity, in pricing, use and abuse prevention

Read on for more information on The Long Tail in this blog series...

Tags: Long Tail, Wired, Amazon, Netflix, Pareto, Meritocracy, Democracy, Lego, Arbitration, Marketplace, Aggregation, Transparency, Distribution, Torso